CONCERNING PRESIDENT BUSH’S TEXAS AIR NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE

JANUARY 5, 2005

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART

NICHOLSON GRAHAM LLP Michael J. Missal, Esq. Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 778-9000

Counsel to the Independent Review Panel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................4

A. 60 Minutes Wednesday Background..............................................................................6

B. The Pursuit of a Story on President Bush’s TexANG Service ......................................7

C. Obtaining Documents ....................................................................................................8

D. The Production of the September 8 Segment ................................................................8

1. Efforts To Authenticate Documents ........................................................................9
   
2. Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents....................................................11
   
3. Barnes Interview ....................................................................................................12
   
4. White House Reaction ...........................................................................................13
   

E. The Vetting Process .....................................................................................................13

F. Authenticity of the Killian Documents........................................................................18

G. The Aftermath..............................................................................................................19

1. The Initial Response ..............................................................................................20
   
2. The ABC News Report ..........................................................................................23
   
3. The Statements of Marian Carr Knox....................................................................24
   
4. The Change in Source............................................................................................25
   
5. The Apology ..........................................................................................................25
   
6. The Contact With the Kerry Campaign .................................................................26
   

H. Political Agenda...........................................................................................................28

I. Recommendations........................................................................................................28

III. PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION.................................................................................31

IV.

BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................................34

A. 60 Minutes – The Sunday Show ..................................................................................34 B. 60 Minutes Wednesday ................................................................................................34

V.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY..................36

A. Introduction..................................................................................................................36

B. Description of the Organization...................................................................................36

1. Correspondents, Producers and Associate Producers ............................................36
   
2. Executive Producer and The Senior Broadcast Producer ......................................38
   
3. Additional Layers of Review.................................................................................38
   
4. CBS’ Communications Group ...............................................................................39
   

C. The Unique Characteristics of the Production Process for the September 8 Segment........................................................................................................................39

VI. BACKGROUND ON CBS NEWS STANDARDS, THE TEXAS AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION..............................41

A. CBS News Standards ...................................................................................................41

B. Texas Air National Guard Background .......................................................................41

C. Background on Document Authentication...................................................................42

VII. THE PRODUCTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 REPORT ........................................44

A. The Initial Pursuit of the Story in 1999 .......................................................................45

B. The Continuing Investigation in 2000 .........................................................................49

C. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s National Media Appearances in February 2004...........51

1. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Allegations .............................................................52
   
2. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Retractions..............................................................53
   
3. Additional Questions Raised Regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Allegations.............................................................................................................53
4. Doubts at CBS News .............................................................................................55
   
5. Mapes’ Awareness of the Lieutenant Colonel Burkett News Coverage................56
   

D. The Continued Pursuit of a TexANG Story in the Summer of 2004...........................56

1. Following the Leads...............................................................................................57
   
2. Mounting Pressure To Get a Story.........................................................................58
   

E. The Potential for Documents Between Monday, August 23, 2004 – Thursday, September 1, 2004 .......................................................................................................59

1. Courting Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.....................................................................59
   
2. Background Research on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett...........................................62
   
3. Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management Regarding the Shifting Focus of the Story and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Requests .................................................................................................63
4. Mapes’ Initial Contact with the Kerry Campaign..................................................64
   
5. The Involvement of Dan Rather ............................................................................66
   
6. Ben Barnes’ Speech at a Kerry Campaign Rally...................................................66
   
7. Other News Media Coverage of TexANG Issues Between August 23, 2004 and September 1, 2004..................................................................................67

F. Thursday, September 2, 2004 – Monday September 6, 2004......................................68

1. Thursday, September 2: The First Two Documents Were Obtained.....................68

a.

Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett .............................................................68

b.

Preliminary Review of the Documents..................................................................70

c.

Contact with Rather ...............................................................................................71

2. Friday, September 3, 2004: Additional Reporting and The Search for Document Examiners.............................................................................................72

a.

Additional Reporting .............................................................................................72

b.

Retention of the Document Examiners..................................................................73

(i)

Qualifications of the Handwriting and Document Examiners.........................76

(ii)

The Panel’s Findings Regarding the Examiner Selection Process ..................77

c.

Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s Lawyer ...............................77

d.

Mapes’ Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management Regarding Additional Burkett Demands................................................................79

3. Saturday, September 4, 2004: The Authentication Process Continued and Other Issues............................................................................................................80

a.

Contacts with the Document Examiners................................................................80

b.

Other Background Reporting.................................................................................80

c.

Rather’s Involvement.............................................................................................81

d.

Mapes’ Communications with Murphy .................................................................82

4. Sunday, September 5, 2004: Document Authentication Issues, Interviewing and Contact with Lockhart ...............................................................82

a.

Additional Documents from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett......................................82

b.

Further Attempts To Confirm the Killian Documents’ Content............................83

c.

Concerns and Issues First Raised by the Document Examiners............................84

(i)

Emily Will........................................................................................................84

(ii)

Linda James .....................................................................................................85 (iii)James Pierce.....................................................................................................85

(iv)

Marcel Matley..................................................................................................86

d.

Lieutenant Strong Interview ..................................................................................86

e.

Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett Regarding the Source and Efforts To Find Chief Warrant Officer Conn ........................................................89

f.

Mapes’ Contact with Joe Lockhart ........................................................................91

g.

Return to New York and Discussion About the Documents .................................93

1. Press Coverage of TexANG Issues and the Timing of the September 8 Segment..................................................................................................................93
1. Monday, September 6, 2004: The Matley Interview and the Call with Major General Hodges...........................................................................................95
1. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett ...............................................95
   
2. Colonel Hackworth Interview................................................................................96
   
3. Discussions Regarding When To Contact the White House .................................97
   
1. Matley Interview....................................................................................................98
   
1. Meetings with Matley Prior to the Interview...................................................98
   
2. The Matley Interview.......................................................................................99
   
4. Telephone Call with Major General Hodges .......................................................101
   
5. Communications with Senior Management.........................................................104
   

G. Tuesday, September 7, 2004: Additional Interviews and the Vetting Process Begins ........................................................................................................................104

1. Additional Attempts To Locate People Who Might Know About the Documents ...........................................................................................................105
1. Contact with the Document Examiners and Their Concerns About the Documents ...........................................................................................................106
1. Emily Will............................................................................................................106
   
2. Linda James .........................................................................................................108
   
3. Marcel Matley......................................................................................................108
   
4. James Pierce.........................................................................................................109
   

e. Colonel Charles....................................................................................................109

f. Search for Other Document Examiners ...............................................................109

g. Miller’s Concerns................................................................................................110

h. Alerting Management ..........................................................................................110

3. Vetting Sessions...................................................................................................111

a. The Questions Mapes Was Asked .......................................................................112

b. Representations Made About the Source.............................................................112

c. Representations Made About the Document Examiners and the Documents ...........................................................................................................113

d. Kartiganer’s Review of the Transcripts ...............................................................114

4. Ben Barnes Interview...........................................................................................115

5. The Promotion of the September 8 Segment .......................................................116

6. Notifying the White House ..................................................................................116

7. Two New Articles on Missing Records...............................................................117

H. Wednesday, September 8, 2004: Completing the Vetting Process and Airing the Segment................................................................................................................118

1. Bartlett Interview .................................................................................................118

2. Vetting Meeting ...................................................................................................120

a. Discussion of the Documents...............................................................................120

b. The Source ...........................................................................................................121

c. Colonel Hackworth ..............................................................................................122

d. The Document Examiners....................................................................................122

e. Deficiencies in the Vetting Process .....................................................................123

3. Response at 60 Minutes Wednesday to the White House Interview....................124

4. Script Revisions ...................................................................................................124

5. First Screening .....................................................................................................125

6. Decision to Air the Show.....................................................................................126

7. CBS Evening News Promotional Piece: Late Afternoon......................................126

8. Final Screening ....................................................................................................126

I. The September 8 Segment Contained Inaccurate and Misleading Statements..........127

1. The Document Authentication Statement Lacked Support .................................127

2. The Lieutenant Strong Interview Excerpts Conveyed Inaccurate Information ..........................................................................................................127

3. The Ben Barnes Interview Excerpts Were Misleading........................................130

VIII. WHETHER THE CONTENT AND FORMAT OF THE KILLIAN DOCUMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OFFICIAL BUSH RECORDS......................................................................................................................133

A. Comparing the Content of the Killian Documents and the Official Bush Records ......................................................................................................................135

1. February 2, 1972 Memorandum ..........................................................................139

2. May 4, 1972 Memorandum .................................................................................140

3. May 19, 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Killian Memo to File.....................................141

4. August 1, 1972 Memorandum .............................................................................142

5. June 24 and August 18, 1973 Memoranda...........................................................144

B. The Language and Format of the Killian Documents Do Not Match Those of the Official Bush Records..........................................................................................145

1. Location of the Signature Block ..........................................................................146
   
2. Format of the Killian Signature Block.................................................................146
   
3. Abbreviation of “Texas Air National Guard”......................................................147
   
4. Abbreviation of “Fighter Interceptor Squadron” .................................................148
   
5. Abbreviation of “Group” .....................................................................................148
   
6. Abbreviation of “Officer Efficiency Report” ......................................................148
   
7. Abbreviation of “Lieutenant” ..............................................................................148
   
8. Proper Term for Evaluation Board ......................................................................149
   
9. Memorandum Addressed to “Sir”........................................................................149
   
10. The Superscript “th” ............................................................................................149
    

C. Concluding Observations on Meshing of Content and Language .............................150

IX.

THE AFTERMATH ......................................................................................................151

A. General Observations.................................................................................................151
B. September 8-9 – The Initial Attacks ..........................................................................153
C. CBS News Strategy, September 10-13, 2004 ............................................................159

1. Andrew Heyward’s September 10 Directive .......................................................159
   
1. CBS News’ Public Defense of the September 8 Segment...................................162
   
1. Development of the Strategy: The September 10 Conference Call....................162
   
2. The September 10 Press Statement......................................................................164
   
3. Failure to Have Experts to Defend the Documents and the September 10, 2004 CBS Evening News Broadcast.....................................................................166
1. 60 Minutes Wednesday Failed to Reassess Its Reporting ....................................173
1. The Hunt for New Examiners........................................................................174
   
2. Conversations with Peter Tytell.....................................................................174 (iii)Major General Hodges...................................................................................175
2. (iv)Failure to Reassess CBS News’ Reporting....................................................178
   
4. September 11, 2004 .............................................................................................178
   
5. The Continued Defense: September 12-13.........................................................182
   

D. The Beginning of Changes in CBS News Strategy: September 14-15......................187

1. The Initial Strategy on September 14 was Unchanged........................................187
   
2. Disclosure that Two 60 Minutes Wednesday Document Examiners Had Concerns About the Killian Documents ..............................................................192
3. Knox’s Revelations..............................................................................................194
   

E. 60 Minutes Wednesday Develops a New Strategy Beginning September 15............199

1. September 15 and 16............................................................................................199
   
2. The First Indication of Contact with the Kerry Campaign and the On-Camera Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett: September 17-18 .................201
3. Events Leading to the September 20 Apology ....................................................202
   
4. The Lockhart Disclosures ....................................................................................208
   

X.

WHETHER THERE WAS A POLITICAL AGENDA DRIVING THE SEPTEMBER 8 SEGMENT.........................................................................................211

A. Information that Might Suggest a Political Agenda ..................................................212

1. Rather and Mapes’ Long Pursuit of the TexANG Story......................................212
   
2. The Anti-Bush Sources........................................................................................212
   
3. Proposed Use of Colonel Hackworth...................................................................213
   
4. Kerry Campaign Connections..............................................................................214
   

B. Factors that Support a Conclusion that a Political Agenda Did Not Motivate the September 8 Segment...........................................................................................214

1. The Previous Work of Rather and Mapes............................................................214
   
2. The Editing Process Added Balance....................................................................215
   
3. Assuming the Killian Documents Were Authentic, They Added New Data to the Bush TexANG Record...............................................................................216

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................................217

XII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................221

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 8, 2004, CBS News’ 60 Minutes Wednesday aired a segment entitled “For the Record” (the “September 8 Segment” or the “Segment”) concerning President Bush’s Texas Air National Guard (“TexANG”) service.¹ The first part of the Segment was an interview with Ben Barnes, the former Lieutenant Governor of Texas and Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, who said that he had recommended that President Bush be given preferential treatment to obtain a position in the TexANG in 1968. Whether President Bush had received such preferential treatment had previously been the subject of many news stories dating back to 1994 when he first ran for public office.

The second part of the September 8 Segment highlighted four documents² obtained by 60 Minutes Wednesday just a few days earlier. These documents were allegedly “taken from” the personal files of the late Lieutenant Colonel Jerry B. Killian, the Commander of the 111^th Fighter Interceptor Squadron in which then-Lieutenant Bush served from May 1968 to October 1973. These documents, which were said to provide new information on Lieutenant Bush’s TexANG service, were:

1. A memorandum dated May 4, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian ordered Lieutenant Bush to take his annual flying physical;
2. A file memorandum dated May 19, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian discussed a conversation with Lieutenant Bush about a transfer from Texas to Alabama to work on a political campaign, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s displeasure with the requested transfer;
3. A memorandum dated August 1, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that he ordered Lieutenant Bush suspended from flight status due to his failure to meet TexANG standards and his failure to take his required flying physical; and

¹ Transcripts of the September 8 Segment and the other 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News reports pertaining to the Segment that aired from September 8 through September 22 are attached as Exhibits 1A-1L to this Report.

These four documents, along with two others obtained by 60 Minutes Wednesday, are referred to collectively as the “Killian documents.” Copies of the six Killian documents are attached as Exhibits 2A-2F to this Report.

4. A file memorandum dated August 18, 1973 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that a retired TexANG General was putting pressure on various officers to “sugar coat” Lieutenant Bush’s officer evaluation.

In referring to the Killian documents, the September 8 Segment reported that 60 Minutes Wednesday “consulted with a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the material is authentic.” In further support of the documents, former TexANG Lieutenant Robert Strong, identified as a “friend and colleague of Colonel Jerry Killian,” was asked whether there was “any doubt in your mind that these are genuine?” Lieutenant Strong responded, “Well, they are compatible with the way that business was done at that time. They are compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t see anything in the documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the situations, and what were the people that were involved.”

Within hours after the Segment aired, questions about the authenticity of the Killian documents were raised, initially in an outpouring from the so-called blogosphere³ on the Internet. These early questions focused mainly on the typography of the documents. Specifically, it was claimed that since the documents contained a superscript “th,” were proportionally spaced and had Times New Roman font style, they must be forgeries because typewriters in existence at the time the documents were purportedly written did not have the capabilities to produce these features. This was quickly followed by a raging media firestorm in print, on the air and on the Internet about the documents’ authenticity. In response to this crisis, CBS News issued a number of statements and broadcast additional reports between September 9 and 15 defending the Segment and the authenticity of the documents (the “Aftermath”).⁴ Finally, on September 20, 2004, Andrew Heyward, President of CBS News, issued a statement that said, among other things, “Based on what we now know, CBS News cannot prove that the documents are authentic, which is the only acceptable journalistic standard to justify using them in the report. We should not have used them. That was a mistake we deeply regret.”

On September 22, 2004, CBS News announced the appointment of an Independent Review Panel consisting of Dick Thornburgh, former Attorney General of the United States, and

³ A blog is a website that contains an online personal journal, often with reflections, comments, and hyperlinks provided by the writer. ⁴ Copies of the CBS News press statements issued in connection with the Segment between September 8 and September 22 are attached as Exhibits 3A-3L to this Report.

Louis D. Boccardi, former Chief Executive Officer and President of The Associated Press, (the “Panel”) to examine the process by which the September 8 Segment was prepared and broadcast. The Panel was also asked to examine the circumstances surrounding the public statements and news reports by CBS News after September 8 defending the Segment, as well as to make any recommendations it deemed appropriate. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP was retained as counsel to the Panel.

B. The Pursuit of a Story on President Bush’s TexANG Service

The interests of Rather and Mapes in pursuing a story about President Bush’s TexANG service date back to at least 1999. At that time, and again during the presidential election of 2000, they investigated allegations that then-Texas Governor Bush had received preferential treatment in getting into the TexANG in 1968. Although Rather did two interviews about the subject in 1999, no story was put together for airing. They did little further investigating on this matter until 2004, when numerous stories appeared in the media about both presidential candidates’ military service during the Vietnam War era.

C. Obtaining Documents

On August 23, 2004, Mapes learned from a source that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett might have a previously unreleased document related to President Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes believed that a number of news organizations were pursuing this same document from him. She and Michael Smith, a freelance journalist from Texas who was working with Mapes on this story, thereafter had a number of conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in an effort to determine whether he had the document. Ultimately, Mapes and Smith met with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett and his wife on Thursday, September 2, when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided Mapes and Smith with two of the Killian documents: the August 1, 1972 memorandum and another document dated June 24, 1973, which was not used on the September 8 Segment. On September 5, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided Smith with four more documents, three of which were to be used on the September 8 Segment.

Smith told the Panel that when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided the documents on September 2, he said that he had received them anonymously in the mail. Mapes had a different recollection of what Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said at the same meeting about the source of the documents. Mapes said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett stated that he received the documents after he was interviewed on a national television show in February 2004 concerning President Bush’s TexANG service, but did not say how he received them or from whom. Mapes added that she spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on several occasions over the next couple of days to get more information about the source of the documents. Ultimately, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told Mapes on either September 4 or 5 that he had received the documents from another former Texas Army National Guardsman, Chief Warrant Officer George Conn, a statement that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett would later admit was not true. Mapes and her team of associate producers did virtually nothing to attempt to contact Chief Warrant Officer Conn to confirm this story and further trace the chain of custody of the documents.

D. The Production of the September 8 Segment

Once the documents were obtained by Mapes and Smith, there was a frenetic effort to “crash” the Segment, meaning to prepare the Segment for broadcast quickly. Among other things, the documents needed to be authenticated, five interviews had to be taped, including with former Lieutenant Governor Barnes, and with White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett, and the script for the story needed to be written and vetted. Despite this enormous amount of work and the great sensitivity of the subject matter, it was decided to move up the date the story would air from September 29, the first scheduled show for the 60 Minutes Wednesday fall season, to September 8, a mere six days after the first Killian documents were obtained and only three days after the four other Killian documents were received. This decision on timing was driven in significant part by competitive pressures, as other news organizations were working on stories related to President Bush’s TexANG service.

1. Efforts To Authenticate Documents

Since Mapes’ regular associate producer was out on maternity leave, another associate producer with whom she had not previously worked, Yvonne Miller, was assigned late on Thursday, September 2, to assist Mapes in putting the story together. The first assignment that Mapes gave to Miller on Friday, September 3, was to have the documents authenticated. Neither Mapes nor Miller had any prior experience in document or handwriting analysis or the mechanics of document authentication.

The field of forensic document examination is fraught with controversy and has differing and sometimes antagonistic certifying organizations. However, it is generally agreed that authentication of a document is best done with the original, so that a chemical analysis of the ink and paper, as well as a close review of any signature and the typography, can be conducted. In addition, document examiners typically reach their conclusions with varying degrees of certainty. A common finding is that the document in question does not have any indication that it is not authentic.

Given the tight deadline, Miller did not have sufficient time to learn the fundamentals of document authentication. Had she known the basics, she would have realized that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to authenticate the Killian documents because they were copies, the alleged author was dead and no person could be located who was alleged to have been present when the documents were prepared. She instead called various people who she believed had experience in the document and handwriting field to identify potential examiners with requisite expertise. After approximately six hours of work on Friday, September 3, Miller had found four examiners who seemed to have expertise in document and handwriting authentication and who were willing to work over the Labor Day weekend.

The four examiners initially were provided with the two documents obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2: (i) the June 24, 1973 memorandum, which was not used in the Segment but included a signature which purported to be that of Lieutenant Colonel Killian; and (ii) the August 1, 1972 memorandum, which only contained initials. The four examiners also were provided with 17 other pages of documents from Lieutenant Bush’s TexANG records that had been obtained from the government via requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) (the “official Bush records”) so that Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s purported signature on the June 24, 1973 memorandum could be compared with his signatures on those documents.

Over the next few days, the examiners analyzed the two documents and had several conversations with both Mapes and Miller. Two of the examiners told the Panel that they informed Mapes and Miller that they had various concerns about the documents. Significantly, all four of the examiners told the Panel that they informed Mapes and Miller that they could not authenticate the documents, primarily because they were copies.

One of the examiners, Marcel Matley, informed Miller on September 5 that based on his initial review, he believed that the signatures from the June 24, 1973 memorandum and those from the official Bush records were from the same person since he noticed “consistent inconsistencies.” Mapes decided to bring Matley to New York on September 6 to be interviewed for the September 8 Segment. When Matley arrived in New York, he was shown the four other documents provided by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on the previous day. Matley told the Panel that he informed Mapes and Miller at the time that he could not authenticate the documents, and Matley’s contemporaneous notes from September 6 support this recollection.⁵ Instead, Matley advised Mapes and Miller that he could comment only on the signatures of Lieutenant Colonel Killian that were included in some of the documents. Matley opined that while one of the signatures of Lieutenant Colonel Killian that he had examined had “conspicuous differences” from signatures on the official Bush records, the “preponderance of available handwriting evidence” was that one person had written all of the signatures. Matley repeated this opinion in an interview with Rather that evening. It was ultimately decided not to include any portion of the Matley interview in the September 8 Segment, at least in part because it was felt that Matley did not clearly explain his opinion.

⁵ Copies of Matley’s handwritten notes from September 6 are attached as Exhibit 5 to this Report.

2. Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents

Aside from the efforts to authenticate the documents, Mapes also attempted to locate people who could verify the content of the documents. One such person contacted by Mapes was Lieutenant Robert Strong, who had served as an administrative officer in the TexANG. Lieutenant Strong had previously been interviewed by Rather for a possible story in 1999. At that time, he was asked about preferential treatment in getting into the TexANG, and he said that a number of people appeared to get preferential treatment. He noted at the time, however, that he had no personal knowledge about whether Lieutenant Bush received preferential treatment in getting into the TexANG.

On September 5, as the production of the September 8 Segment gathered force, Rather left his coverage of a hurricane in Florida to interview Lieutenant Strong in Austin, Texas. Mapes was also present at the interview. Lieutenant Strong was shown the Killian documents for the first time 20 minutes before the interview began. During the interview, Lieutenant Strong was asked whether he had any doubt that the documents were genuine. Lieutenant Strong responded, “Well, they are compatible with the way business was done at that time. They are compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don’t see anything in the documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the situations and what were the people that were involved.” This response was included in the September 8 Segment.

The Panel finds this use of Lieutenant Strong’s statement to be misleading. Lieutenant Strong told the Panel that he resigned from the TexANG in March 1972, two months before the date of the earliest Killian document used in the September 8 Segment, that he had no personal knowledge of Lieutenant Bush’s service in the TexANG, and that he did not have any personal knowledge of the content of the documents. Lieutenant Strong explained to the Panel that he gave the response he did because Mapes had assured him that four experts were in the process of authenticating the documents. Lieutenant Strong advised the Panel that his response should have included the caveat that he did not have any personal knowledge of the content of the documents, but if they were authentic, then they reflected the “principles” of Lieutenant Colonel Killian.

Rather and Mapes arrived back in New York after the Lieutenant Strong interview early in the morning of September 6. The rush to prepare the Segment for possible broadcast on September 8 continued in full force. Among other matters, Mapes called Major General Bobby Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian’s commanding officer during the relevant time period, on Monday, September 6 to discuss the content of the Killian documents. Mapes told the Panel that Major General Hodges would not agree to an on-camera interview, but agreed to have the documents read to him over the telephone. Mapes told the Panel that he confirmed the content of the four documents and that this was a key factor in bolstering the conclusion that the documents were authentic.

Major General Hodges told the Panel a different version of his conversation with Mapes. Major General Hodges said that he did not confirm the content of the documents but only said that he and Lieutenant Colonel Killian had discussed the fact that Lieutenant Bush had missed a flying physical and that Lieutenant Bush wanted to transfer to Alabama. Major General Hodges also told the Panel that he did not believe that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had ever ordered anyone to take a physical, including Lieutenant Bush. Major General Hodges further told the Panel that General Walter (“Buck”) Staudt had never pressured him regarding Lieutenant Bush, as alleged in the August 18, 1973 memorandum. Moreover, Major General Hodges said that when he finally saw the documents after the September 8 Segment aired, he was convinced that they were not authentic and told this to Rather and Mapes in a telephone call on September 10, 2004.

Major General Hodges gave the Panel a number of specific reasons why he did not believe that the documents were authentic, including the use of a number of allegedly erroneous terms and abbreviations. Some of the deviations from standard format and usage mentioned by Major General Hodges included: (i) the location and format of the signature block; (ii) the abbreviations for Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Texas Air National Guard, group and officer efficiency training report; (iii) the use of the terms “billet” and “billets”; and (iv) the reference to a flight review board. While some of these observations may seem trivial, each branch of the military uses specified standard abbreviations and terms. Major General Hodges did not think that Lieutenant Colonel Killian, with whom he served for 20 years, would have written documents with so many deviations from standard format.

3. Barnes Interview

On Tuesday, September 7, Rather interviewed Ben Barnes, and a number of excerpts from this interview appeared in the September 8 Segment. The Panel has several concerns about whether the airing of the Barnes interview excerpts constituted fair and accurate reporting by 60 Minutes Wednesday. For example, the excerpts pertaining to Barnes conveyed the unmistakable impression that President Bush gained entry into the TexANG through preferential treatment. Barnes stated, however, that he did not know if his call to a TexANG official back in 1968 made any difference with respect to President Bush. Further, Mapes had been told previously by several former TexANG officers that President Bush entered the TexANG without any preferential treatment. Finally, Mapes confirmed to the Panel that there was conflicting information about whether there even was a waiting list to get in the TexANG as of the spring of 1968. At a minimum, these issues should have been disclosed to the 60 Minutes Wednesday management, but they were not.

4. White House Reaction

The morning of Wednesday, September 8, the Killian documents were delivered to White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett in anticipation of an interview to get a reaction from the White House. CBS News correspondent John Roberts interviewed Bartlett at around 11 a.m. at the White House. Bartlett did not dispute the authenticity of the documents at that time but denied in the interview that the documents showed that President Bush did anything improper during his service in the TexANG. The Panel was informed by West, Howard, Mapes, Kartiganer and two CBS lawyers involved in the vetting, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard Altabef, that Bartlett’s failure to challenge the authenticity of the documents hours before the Segment was to air provided further comfort that the documents were authentic.

E. The Vetting Process

All 60 Minutes Wednesday stories go through a vetting process. The degree of vetting depends on a variety of factors, including whether the story is an investigative report and what information is presented in the segment. At a minimum, the vetting of all stories entails a review by Executive Producer Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Murphy, a review by Senior Producer Kartiganer of the excerpts of interviews that are to be used in stories to ensure that they reflect a fair edit from the full interviews and a final fairness and accuracy screening by West. Sternberg and Altabef, who have been in-house counsel for CBS for over 20 years each, also may become involved in the vetting process depending on the type of story and issues involved.

The September 8 Segment should have received the highest degree of vetting because, among other reasons, the Segment:

1. Was a major investigative piece that was produced in a very short period of time;
2. Was pursued intermittently for over five years, which could cause the correspondent and producer to become too personally invested in the story;
3. Was to be released in the middle of a presidential campaign and was highly negative to one candidate (President Bush);
4. Involved a source who did not want his identity disclosed;
5. Involved a second source who had never been located by 60 Minutes Wednesday;
6. Relied on documents that could not be verified by their purported author because he was deceased;
7. Relied on documents that were not originals; and
8. Was the first original story aired under the direction of the new 60 Minutes Wednesday management team.

The Panel finds that the vetting process for the September 8 Segment was seriously flawed. The Panel believes that this was caused in large part by the speed with which this Segment was produced. The Panel also believes that the vetting process was not sufficient because too much deference was given to Mapes because of her experience and much admired history at CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday, as well as her association with Rather. Rather does not appear to have participated in any of the vetting sessions or to have even seen the Segment before it was aired.

Mapes began to write the script in earnest on Tuesday, September 7. There were several meetings and screenings to vet the script with various combinations of West, Howard, Murphy, Kartiganer, Sternberg and Altabef on September 7 and 8. West typically did not get involved in the vetting process until the story was ready for a final screening. Heyward, however, asked West by no later than September 7 to become more deeply involved, which evidenced his recognition that this was an important and potentially controversial story. Thus, Heyward cautioned West and Howard in an e-mail on September 7 not to be “stampede[d]” and that “we’re going to have to defend every syllable of this one . . .”

Given the significance of the Killian documents, it was critical for the vetters to know the background, identity, credibility, motivations, biases and other relevant information about the sources of the documents. All agree that they knew virtually nothing about Chief Warrant Officer Conn, who at that time was thought to be the ultimate source. Mapes and the vetters have different accounts as to what she told them about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Most of the vetters told the Panel that they did not think they heard the name Bill Burkett as the source of the documents prior to the airing of the Segment but did know that the source was a former National Guardsman. Even if the name Bill Burkett had been mentioned, all the vetters said it would not have meant anything to them.

Significantly, no one said that Mapes gave any indication of the level of controversy in her source’s background. They told the Panel that the source was described by Mapes in different meetings and conversations on September 6 through 8 in various terms, including “solid,” “without bias,” “credible,” “a Texas Republican of a different chromosome,” a “John McCain supporter,” “reliable” and “a maverick.” The only significant negatives about her immediate source that they described hearing from Mapes were that he had a quarrel with the National Guard over disability payments, that an investigation that he and three other National Guardsmen had been directed to conduct concerning the National Guard had been abruptly stopped and that he was not a supporter of President Bush.

These descriptions are in stark contrast to how Mapes told the Panel she described her source during the vetting process. First, Mapes said that she did not shield Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s name from West, Howard, Murphy or Kartiganer. Second, Mapes said that she provided all of the details of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s background that she knew to these same people, that he became a controversial figure in February 2004 when his story about the “scrubbing” of President Bush’s TexANG records had been publicized and challenged, that he was a “moralistic whistleblower,” and that he was one of the most vocal critics of President Bush’s TexANG service. Mapes also claimed that she disclosed less significant details about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, including the name of his wife, his financial condition and the fact that he used a dog to assist him with an illness.

As noted above, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had told Mapes on either September 4 or 5 that he received the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Mapes told the Panel that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told her that Chief Warrant Officer Conn, if contacted by Mapes, would not confirm that he had provided the documents to him. Mapes said that she attempted to call Chief Warrant Officer Conn at an address in Texas, but was unable to contact him. Mapes added that it was her understanding that he was living in Germany, but she did not try to locate him in Germany. Mapes further told the Panel that since she believed she had independent verification of the content of the documents from Major General Hodges late on Monday, September 6, she did not believe it necessary to pursue Chief Warrant Officer Conn further.

The Panel finds this explanation difficult to accept. Mapes had known that Chief Warrant Officer Conn was the alleged source of the Killian documents since sometime on September 5 at the latest and could not have known in advance that Major General Hodges allegedly would confirm the content of the documents late on September 6. Further, the Segment would contain the statement that the Killian documents “were taken from Colonel Killian’s personal files.” Mapes told the Panel that she was told this by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, but had not been able to corroborate it with Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Thus, it appears to the Panel that a crash to air the story was under way without effective consideration of the chain of custody.

In contrast, the vetters told the Panel that Mapes informed them that the source of the documents received them from another person who could not be located. None of the vetters recalls hearing Chief Warrant Officer Conn’s name or other details about this ultimate source of the Killian documents. The failure to obtain more information about the chain of custody should have raised the bar for proof of authenticity. Instead, it was not pursued and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett’s later different version as to how he got the documents would prove to overwhelm 60 Minutes Wednesday’s dogged but doomed defense of the Segment.

The Panel finds that the vetters should have asked more questions about the ultimate source of the Killian documents. Given the importance of the documents to the Segment, the high sensitivity of the story, and the use in the Segment of the uncorroborated assertion that the documents came “from Colonel Killian’s personal files,” it was critical to understand precisely and in great detail how the source came to acquire the documents. Without a detailed understanding of the ultimate source of the documents and the chain of custody, the other efforts to authenticate the documents and their content became that much more critical.

The authentication of the Killian documents is another area where a serious conflict exists between what the Panel was told by the vetters and what Mapes told the Panel. Mapes said that she told everyone involved in the story that there were four examiners and that while two of the examiners (Matley and James Pierce) could not authenticate the documents, they found “no exclusionary points” that would preclude them from being authentic. Mapes told the Panel that the statement from the September 8 Segment that “we consulted a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the material is authentic” was based on conclusions by Matley. Mapes further told the Panel that she disclosed that a third examiner (Emily Will) had raised questions, but had deferred to Matley when she was told that he had endorsed the documents, and that a fourth examiner (Linda James) said she could not authenticate the documents without reviewing the originals.

The recollections of the vetters concerning what they were told by Mapes about the document examiners were not always clear or consistent. Most of the vetters told the Panel that Mapes told them that there were four examiners, including the “Dean” of document examiners (Matley), who had authenticated all or some of the documents, without any reservation or qualification. In any event, none of the vetters believed that there were any outstanding concerns related to the authentication of the documents prior to the airing of the Segment.

Regardless of what was told to the vetters about the examiners, the Panel is seriously troubled by the vetting process pertaining to the authentication of the Killian documents. Like Mapes and Miller, none of the individuals involved in the vetting process had any prior experience in the authentication of documents or handwriting analysis. None of these people sought to learn more about the document authentication process, including the limitations of having copies instead of originals. Had any of the vetters spoken to any of the examiners, they would have immediately realized the challenges posed in attempting to authenticate a copy of a document.

Mapes also told the Panel that she informed the vetters that the substance of the documents had been verified by another National Guardsman, Major General Hodges, whose name was included in an early version of the script that was available to the vetters on September 8, though his name was not actually used on the air in the final script.⁶ Mapes told the vetters that Major General Hodges’ confirmation of the content of the documents gave her significant additional comfort as to the authenticity of the documents.

This alleged confirmation by Major General Hodges started to march 60 Minutes Wednesday into dangerous and ultimately unsustainable territory: the notion that since the content of the documents was felt to be true, demonstrating the authenticity of the documents became less important.

⁶ However, as noted above, Major General Hodges denied to the Panel that he gave such confirmation.

The Panel’s investigation included interviewing other people who might have had knowledge of the content of the documents, but who were not interviewed by 60 Minutes Wednesday about the documents prior to airing the September 8 Segment. These people included officers who served at Ellington Air For