[read this slowly, especially the bottom]
OK guys and gals, I have a theory.
I could work it alone and win all sorts or praise if I blew the story sky high… But I’m far more interested in proving it/disproving this theory. A bottle of Champaign for anyone proving it and a big attaboy for disproving it. I’d love to bust this before before the big media even thinks about it.
The Background
Link from my post below, I’m going to highlight some things so nobody gets confused. (Spoons you can stop reading now 😉
The information on which the Iraqi Science Ministry based an Oct. 10 memo in which it reported that 377 tons of RDX explosives were missing
Im on it!
Spreading the word and the truth.
Boy, is Rather going to be pissed!
Just subscribed to this comment thread.
OOPs, Just subscribed to this comment thread.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2167933.stm
No inspectors present in Iraq until September of 2002.
I haven’t finished reading your entire post yet, Paul, but I believe you’re starting from a misconception. Even when I first read the ABC piece, what I got from it was that the 141 tons were in one of the declarations that Iraq provided IAEA periodically.
So the IAEA didn’t inspect them in July 2002. In fact, there were no inspectors in Iraq at that time, remember? They didn’t return until late that year.
Okay, now I’ll go back and finish reading.
I haven’t finished reading your entire post yet,
Grrrr Don’t make me hurt you
Before I forget, your ABC quote actually says the declaration was from the Iraqis:
At that time, the Iraqis said there were 141 tons of RDX explosives at the facility.
Okay, now that I’ve finished reading the post, I don’t think the source of the July 2002 report matters. The important point is that in January 2003, IAEA inspectors reported only 3 tons of RDX were present.
That alone blows this whole thing out of the water, in my opinion.
——————————-
and these facts were never given to the UN Security Council
That might be the most difficult item to prove.
Were IAEA reports ever presented in SC executive session? How do you get the minutes or copies of the reports?
——————————–
Hey, I ain’t afraid a nobody fum Loseriana.
Regardless of the outcome of this experiment, I give you guys/gals credit for asking the questions and asking for answers. A very good reason I now look to you bloggers for my news and information
wget -m, grep, find, |, are your friends in this search.
Mirror their site locally, (rate limit it if necessary, use googlebot as the agent if necessary) then search through the site locally, much faster than searching the site over the web, and you can customize the searches many ways. And you can search google at the same time. Come up empty? Don’t forget the way back when machine, and other site archiving projects in case the material or articles have been removed. And don’t forget the BBC has a lot of archives online, for those without lexis nexxus accounts to burn someone else’s money on.
I posted the request over at LGF, and at Suite101. Hopefully something will come of it shortly.
IAEA reported in S/2003/95 that it inspected and verified 196 tons of HMX. This inspection took place sometime between the resumption of inspections on Nov 27 2002 and the release of this report on Jan 27 2003.
The report also indicates that the IAEA got the backlogged semi-annual reports from 1998 to 2002 in December of 2002. One of them, probably the starting point document, would have been the July 15 2002 Semi-Annual Declaration.
My guess (only a guess now) is that the IAEA took the Iraqi’s word for it that they had 141 tons of RDX and never inspected it because no one was raising hell about RDX, just HMX. The Iraqis could very well have used all that RDX and then reported in their next Semi-Annual Declaration due on Jan 15 2003 that they only had 3 tons left.
First, a big thanks! Bloggers are a terrific check and balance system for the Legacy Media.
Wizbang is one of my favorites.
Second- a question about something that may need correcting. I am reading the IAEA report as saying that at one point there were nearly 195 tons of HMX, which I think most people have agreed are not so worrisome as the other stuff, and 147 tons of RDX.
Then they went back later and found only 3 tons of of the RDX. – and this is where I am seeing something different.
The majority of bloggers seem to be reading this as saying only 3 tons of RDX and nothing else. I am reading this as the other stuff was there in the same amounts, but the RDX had been tampered with and only 3 tons was left of *it*- not only 3 tons of all explosives.
Frankly, this is mainly important for credibility and the tenacious sticking to the facts that bloggers not supported by Soros are noted for. But those assets are valuable enough to protect.
http://www.iraqwatch.org/profiles/nuclear.html
“Iraq also started working on spherical lenses as early as 1988, and experimented with various kinds of explosives, including Baratol, PETN, COM-B, TNT, RDX and HMX. Iraq revealed to IAEA-4 that hundreds of tons of HMX had been imported, and that Iraq had gained “considerable experience in casting such material.” The HMX was used to make improved explosive lenses for the Iraqi bomb. The Al Qaqaa team also mastered the design of dedicated exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators, after experimenting with several types. In fact, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy helped train three Iraqi scientists from Al Qaqaa at a quadrennial international detonation conference in Portland, Oregon, where nuclear weapon detonation technology and flyer plate technology were presented. The latter is used to control the force and shape of implosive shock waves.”
1988. That far back they were ID’ing it
“If I’m putting the cart before the horse, Spoons is sure to tell me but I don’t think my theory is too far out there from reading this report. “
How can I, when you told me several paragraphs above to stop reading?!? 🙂
But anyway, I think this is mostly right, with a couple of reservations. One, I’m a little concerned about the issue Wendi Sue raises, which I had tried to figure out last night and this morning, but couldn’t. Two (and this is a really minor point), I think you may be making too much of the fact that the SC was not notified of the movement of this stuff way back when. As I understand it, this is not particularly exotic material we’re talking about here — certainly not WMDs. IT doesn’t surprise me that ther wouldn’t have been much focus on it.
lawhawk thanks
Varuth you rock
Wendi Sue– “Legacy Media” OUCH! –
Spoons, you have a real name? And that was a test, I knew you would ignore it. lol
But lemme wring out your point- Remember all the debate before the war- everyday somebody testified before the SC. IF IF IF 138 tons of explosives used to detonate nuclear weapons turned up missing in that time frame and it was ignored?????? Big story.
Update 1: Boyd reminds be that I wanted to address something. It was my understanding (prior to this story) the IAEA SAID there was 141 tons there. This story, which is not worded as clearly as if could be, said “Iraq declared.”
If Iraq could self declare, did they inflate the number or did some truly get moved before Jan???
Can anyone find if the “inspected country” can self declare? Seems almost worthless if they can.
On the issue of self-declaration, if you recall, one of the sticking points during the rigamarole prior to the war was the fact that Iraq was required to present a report detailing what and where all the inspected items were. If I recall correctly, they ultimately turned in a 12,000-page document that was total gibberish.
I point that out because there are apparently provisions in the inspection regime that required Iraq to report on certain things. Recall that when Hans Blix issued his famous report, there was page after page of “Iraq has no documentation on this”.
Now, on to the conjecture. It sounds as if Iraq was required to periodically verify that the IAEA seals were in place and that the quantities were correct. On July 15, 2002, they “verified” the 141-ton figure in a report. Come January 2003, when the inspectors arrived, they found only 3 tons. The only thing we know for sure is that between the last inspections previously (1997 or 1998) and January 2003, 138 tons of explosives disappeared. Those are the last two times that any eyes other than Iraqi eyes saw the material.
excellent point steve
http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/IAEA/S-1995-1003.htm
Don’t forget Steve that in 1991 supposedly at the Al Qaqaa facility much of the equipment and weapons machination hardware was removed in the begining of 1991.
But I can’t seem to find via tracking where the stuff went. Anyone want to take a guess as to wether or not the expolsives where as well?
I E-mailed Kevin on the Self Declaration.
Iraq was told to declare their own munitions in total. Basicaly an attempt to ‘Come Clean” in part of UN Ressolution 687/1991.
They had till April 15th to step to the plate and show their cards.
Ok… quick timeline summary of IAEA activity at Al Qa Qaa. Begins here
Nov 30 2002 – An IAEA team completed some work at the Al Qa Qaa Company, specifically the removal of the last of four air samplers previously installed and planned to be refurbished, upgraded and reinstalled in the near future.
Dec 8 2002 – IAEA receives Iraqi declarations at its Vienna HQ. (ref. S/2003/95)
Dec 9 2002 – An IAEA team at Al Qa Qaa began inventorying known explosive materials from the past nuclear programme that were previously under the control of the IAEA. Other tasks involved inspecting a number of key buildings and outdoor sites within the huge Al Qa Qaa complex.
Dec 10 2002 – Another team investigated an outlying site of the Al Qa Qaa explosives plant. The outlying site, called Sumood-4, is near the city of Mussayib and was associated with a past program. Sumood-4 is co-located with the Sadda Cement Factory. The cement plant was also inspected for dual-use capabilities.
Dec 16 2002 – Another IAEA team visited four sites: Al Qa Qaa, Mussayib Army Munitions Depot, Al Motaseem Factory, and the Hatteen Establishment’s testing range. The team monitored the production of small rockets. These sites work as a unit in the Iraqi military armaments structure to produce and test munitions.
Dec 25 2002 – In a cooperative venture, the IAEA team joined with Iraqi auditors at the Al Qa Qaa explosives plant. They together made item counts of important dual-use materials and compared results. Hundreds of items were counted. The results will be used as part of a verification of Iraq’s use of special metals.
Jan 24 2003 – An UNMOVIC chemical team returned to the Al Qa Qaa complex for the seventh day. The team inspected the Research and Development Centre and a waste treatment facility.
Feb 4 2003 – Two IAEA teams conducted two inspections. One team inspected the Al Mamoun plant of the Al Qa Qaa Establishment south of Baghdad. A second IAEA team, with support from UNMOVIC, inspected the former site of the Al Salam Company, formerly associated with biological weapons development, in the Salman Pak area south of Baghdad.
Perhaps the real question here should be whether John Kerry overheard anything about the Al Qaqaa munitions stash during his super-secret meetings with the UN Security Council …
Also, may I suggest a new name for this scandal, with a hat-tip to the unbelievably sloppy work done by the NYT:
“Failure-To-Investi-Gate”
The IAEA has come forward saying there is no discrpency. Only 3 tons of RDX was at that location. The rest was at another location 45 km away, that they considered part of Al QaQaa as far as reporting is concerned. Sounds pretty strange to me.
So now, either the IAEA is lying, or there was never more than 3 tons of RDX at the specific location that troops were at. I haven’t heard anything about anyone confirming that RDX was or was not at the location 45 km away, but if it was gone it is just more circumstantial evidence that the stuff was moved prior to the war rather than looted after the war. It was tough enough to beleive that looters could sneak into one location with dozens of tractor-trailers to steal explosives without being seen. It is impossible to believe that they could have snuck into 2 locations 45 km apart with dozens of trucks in each location, and not be seen.
OK. Iraq had to make semi-annual reports to the UN. From Hons Blix’s report prior to the war (Page 14):
Although there have been some inconsistencies and discrepancies in Iraq
– As an aside FOX is now reporting that serious questions are being raised by industry insiders into the possibility that NY Times “leaked” the upcoming news release to the Kerry campaign ahead of time…
– The spark in the hey pile is the speed that the Kerry people were able to air an Ad citing information contained in Sangers article so quickly and comments Kerry made back some time ago where he mentions several NYT reporters by name, Sanger being one of them, who “[think] it would take a change in presidency to move America back on track”….
– developing…..
– The “Companies of the Islamic armies”, yet another group of terrorists are now saying in a video on Al Zazerra, that they have the explosives all 340 tons, and they will use them on Coalition forces, (never mind they would require advaned processing to be usable in conventional weapons)….
– Does that asshole Kerry either know or give a flying f*** that what he’s doing is yet another traitorous anti-American act and playing into the hands of the insurgents? Its going beyond wanting to see that elitist scum bag lose…I’m starting to loath the SOB…..
has anyone here looked at the footage from the minneapolis tv station supposedly embedded with the 101st? they’re showing video which they claim was shot onsite at qaqaa showing huge amounts of stuff labeled explosives. now my query would be why is all of this iraqi stuff labeled in english, but this might be worth looking into.
http://www.kstp.com/article/stories/S3723.html?cat=1
The IAEA and UN are useless (REDUNDANCY ALERT), but I did find a couple of things:
1. Inspections restarted on 25 November 2002 and continued until 17 March 2003.
2. IAEA inspected Al Qa Qaa three times: 9 December, 28 December (this may have been an UNMOVIC inspection) and 14 January. UNMOVIC inspected there several times, but for rocket motor production issues.
3. On December 10, IAEA inspected Sumood-4 which may be the mythical “outlying” facility which is described as:
A team investigated an outlying site of the Al Qa Qaa explosives plant. (The main Al Qa Qaa complex was inspected on Monday.) The outlying site, called Sumood-4, is near the city of Mussayib and was associated with a past program. Sumood-4 is co-located with the Sadda Cement Factory.
I did find this interesting tidbit from a December 1997 letter from the IAEA to the UN:
In accordance with its notification to IAEA, Iraq removed IAEA seals from five of the six high-explosive bunkers at the Al Qa Qaa facility and dispersed approximately 50 tons out of the total of 228 tons of high explosives (HMX) stored in the bunkers to other locations at Al Qa Qaa. IAEA inspectors have witnessed the return of this material to its original storage location and have taken measures to account for the original inventory. There are no indications that any of this material has been diverted.
Clearly, Iraq had no problem removing IAEA seals in the past.
Clearly, Iraq had no problem removing IAEA seals in the past.
I sure wouldn’t. What are these seals, anyway? Are we talking about little stick’ums?
Hunter and all,
Remember, Kerry brought up the idea of un-secured ammo dumps in the second debate.
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html
This debate happened on October 8th.
Varuth you are going to bust this
Bret Baier of Fox News reporting at 2:15 PM today stated that the satellite images of the explosives being moved prior to our invasion may be released to the media by this evening. Bret continues to maintain a fair and balanced posture while making his on-camera report, but in essence he’s saying the explosives story by the NY Times, CBS and the Kerry assclowns is bullshit. The Dems in response are left having to say, “Well, we don’t know when the explosives were taken or how much of it was stolen and whether there was 388 tons or 3 tons or 150 tons (as stated in a UN report).”
BTW, as with Rathergate, the media are left having to practically say they know the NY Times story is accurate because George W. Bush sucks.
You know how to get Kerry to stop lying that Bush fired that army general (Sinenski?)? Bush should tell the media that he fired that general for not securing ammo dumps properly. Then Kerry will say, “Bush didn’t fire the general. The general’s time was up and he left the joint chiefs.” LOL
a couple of points…
although RDX is a very dangerous explosive, the IAEA was much less concerned with it than with HDX, whose properties make it idea for use in the creation of the explosive lens needed to detonate a nuclear bomb.
But more important is the fact that the administration has been covering up the fact that this material has been missing for EIGHTEEN MONTHS.
Remember, it was the job of the Iraq Survey Group to inventory and account for everything having to do, or possibly having to do, with Iraq’s WMD programs. An army unit working with the ISG went to al QaQaa at least three times in May 2003 (although MSNBC is now reporting that each visit was less than six hours in length, the ISG voa the IAEA doubtless knew the exact locations where the HGX was stored, and could have verified its presence, or loss, in far less than six hours.).
In other words, Kay and Duelfer (and the Bush administration) KNEW 18 months ago that there was an excellent possibility that these MAJOR explosives, useful in fabricating nukes, had gone missing….but only NOW, once that information has been made public, is the administration bothering to try and figure out where the stuff went.
This is called dereliction of duty, folks. If they had “checked the tapes” as soon as they discovered that the HTX was missing, they MIGHT have been able to find some, or most, of it before it was dispersed to terrorists. But trying to track it down now, 18 months after the fact, is going to be impossible.
And face it, it is BECAUSE of Bush’s decisions that this stuff is now missing. He was warned that it would take hundreds of thousands of troops to secure Iraq properly, and he ignored that advice, assuming instead that we would be greeted with flowers, and that there would be no significant resistance after the fall of Baghdad.
Even an idiot would have realized that Saddam might choose a “guerrilla” campaign—its obvious that is what the Taliban did, and Saddam may have been insane, but he also knew his military was no match for the USA. Bush’s failure to plan for what did happen—his assumption that the ONLY course of action that Saddam would pursue would be a fight to the death in Baghdad—and his continued REFUSAL to admit that he made a mistake, is all the reason you need to fire Bush, and bring in a new CEO.
From the NYT:
However, a United Nations agency has called the ABC news report into question, saying that it cited an inspection report of a single day and that most of the explosives were kept at another site that the United Nations agency considered part of the overall storage area, the A.P. said. Reuters, quoting a spokeswoman for the nuclear agency, said the two sites were about 28 miles apart.
— What are these seals, anyway?
Baradei wears a special ring. When he wants to seal something, a lackey fetches a red candle and a match, melts some wax over the lock and Mohamad presses his ring into the hardening wax.
That’s security, UN style.
UPDATE
Just wanted you guys to know that my buddy who works for AP is watching the thread. He reads the blog anyway just to mock me. But he called about 30 minutes ago to say he was watching to see if we fit the pieces together.
I also some to another news person since then, but more on that another time.
I’m dramatically late, I should have been out the door 40 minutes ago, so I’m outta here. But about 6 eastern, I hope to make a summation post of what we learned.
Regarding the Kerry ammo dump comment from above… Kerry said: “Didn’t even guard the ammo dumps.
From reading the mind-numbingy stupid reports from the IAEA to the UN during that time, I found the following tidbit from January 9, 2002:
The relocation and consumption of some dual use materials has been among the questions raised in connection with Iraq’s backlog of semi-annual declarations. The high explosive “HMX” is a prime example of such material….The Iraqi declarations indicate that out, of the 228 tonnes of HMX available in Iraq at the end of 1998, 196 remained at the facility where the HMX was previously under IAEA seal….The material balance, current stock, whereabouts and final use of such material are currently being investigated.
There are at least two more mentions of HMX in subsequent reports but no mention of the “material balance, current stock, whereabouts, and final use” of the HMX. Both reports say that it has been very difficult to determine the facts.
I think paul lukasiak brings up some obvious points even if he does it in a rather abrasive way.
I do not know the imaging capabilities of our military but I am assuming that we would have had 24 hour sat coverage of Iraq in the period leading up to the war. I also assume that we would have paid special attention to the major suspected sites in Iraq.
As paul points out we would have been able to verify that these explosives were missing shortly after we took over power in the country.
So why are we only hearing about it now?
1. The administration, including the military commanders on the ground, and the ISG did not see these explosives as a big deal. They were focused on other issues, and were not surprised in the least that there was some inconsistency with the prior IAEA reports.
2. The administration, including the military commanders on the ground and the ISG are rather incompetent and failed to notice, or bother to compare their findings with the IAEA reports.
3. The administration found out the material was missing only after the invasion, but then was unable to track down how exactly it went missing, either because they had no surveillance of the area, or any such surveillance was inconclusive.
4. The administration knew right away (or even before the invasion) that stuff was missing, and further had clear evidence of the trucks needed to move such material going into the facility and leaving to some new location.
5. other possibilities?
In regards to 1 I suppose it is possible that out of the hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives in Iraq that these particular explosives were just seen as nothing much to worry about. This is contradicted in part by the special attention the IAEA played in investigating them, and the well known application that some of this material had in the construction of a nuclear weapon. Further it seems odd that such clear
But that fact clearly would have impacted the debate and even the implication that he might withhold the evidence is mind-boggling.
If we’re looking to get the IAEA on something shouldn’t the fact that they “lost” 32 tons of HMX be sufficient? ElBardei reported to Hans Blix back in January 2003 that they were unable to verfiy what happened to a large stash of the explosive material yet no one raised an eyebrow over that report.
http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com/archives/000935.html
Kevin, my apologies if this is old news, but I just came across it mixed in with some other CBS news on this story.
Not really to do with your search, but bears on the explosives.
CBS NEWS STORY
(CBS/AP)
Chadeo, don’t overestimate our ability to surveil the many sites of interest throughout Iraq. There are several difficulties.
1) You have a fixed amount of surveillance assets, in this case, satellites.
2) You have to prioritize your surveillance targets, because due to #1 above, you can’t watch everything.
3) Photographic satellite surveillance doesn’t work at night.
4) Photographic satellite surveillance doesn’t work when it’s cloudy.
5) Many, if not most, photographic surveillance satellites are not geostationary, so you look as you pass overhead a target area. When you don’t have an asset in range, you can’t see anything.
Even technical means of intelligence aren’t omniscient.
Interesting link
Found this link
AL QAQAA INFO
Had some company names and more detailed info.
Thought it may help the researchers that are better than me.
Entities at this facility include:
Aqaba Ibn Nafa’a Gen. Est. — metal casings for Project 946
Khalid factory — Production of Al Hussein class missiles (warheads)
Project 144/7 — Production of Al Hussein class missiles (liquid propellants)
Project 144/5 (Farooq project) — Production of Al Hussein class missiles (launchers) Facility abandoned in 1988 after destruction during an industrial accident at the site
Saddam Gen. Est. — nuclear parts, lasers and optical equipment, Tamouz missile
Umm Al Marik Est. — missile fuel and warheads
Al Yarmouk Gen. Est. — missile parts, ammunition with special specifications
Link to Iraq Weapons Inspection Database and Reports
IAEA
Link directly to IAEA Data on Al QaQaa Inpections
msl
Last one sorry.
Link to documents page, includes testimony, other reports…
FAS DOCUMENTS PAGE
msl
Hope any of that may help you guys…
Google is so cool
Other Related links for the pajama clad.
Sorry no time to make this pretty on way out door.
Some other interesting links that bear on inspections and the facility.
Tracking inspections
http://www.rferl.org/specials/iraq-inspec/
Global Security
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/al_qa_qaa.htm
A really warped site that came up in the search. Not to do with inspections, but Geez, who are these ass****?
http://www.nadeshda.org/foren/cl.regionen.irak/p1189s1197a20.html
msl
Boyd thanks for the clarification.
Like I said, I have no idea what kind of surveillance assets we had over Iraq during the time this stuff could have been moved, nor do I know what kind of capability they had.
I tend to agree with you though that there is defiantly not a clear cut case that if the stuff was moved we would have been able to detect it.
This is basically scenario number three in my first post. We verified that the stuff was missing right away, but were not able to come up with any kind of conclusive intelligence as to when it was moved, or where it went to.
If this is in fact that case I just do not see the Bush administration making a big deal out of it. In order to disprove any claims of incompetence they would have to show in some amount of detail why exactly our satellites were not able to catch a rather large scale logistics operation. Such a detailed explanation would be damaging to US interests even if by doing such a thing it might benefit Bush politically.
On the other hand I really hope we have some satellites up there that can monitor inferred during the night and during heavy cloud cover. Such monitoring should be able to pick up a truck convoy.
There have been multiple media accounts of material moving into Syria. I am sure at least some of them have a bit of truth behind them. For example:
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=670123
I think MOHAMMED al-Baradei probably posses the same irrational biases of many Muslims and was trying to influence the US elections knowing that Kerry would be no threat to Iran:
On Monday, a spokesman for the American mission at the United Nations questioned the timing of the release of the material on the part of Mr. ElBaradei. Rick Grenell told the Sun’s Benny Avni the “timing seems puzzling.”
After a behind-the-scenes battle inside the State Department this summer, the Bush administration opted to reject Mr. ElBaradei’s bid for a third term as director general of the atomic energy agency.
At the time, Washington was collecting intelligence – disputed by some agencies – that Mr. ElBaradei was providing advice to Iran on how to avoid sanction from his organization for its previously undisclosed uranium enrichment programs.
Mr. al-Baradei has publicly urged the Iranians to heed an earlier pledge to suspend enrichment, but he has also opposed America’s policy of taking Iranian violations to the U.N. Security Council. Mr. al-Baradei has announced he will nonetheless seek a third term. Nominations for the director general position close on December 31.
Gentlemen, the fox is guarding the henhouse.
al-Baradei doesn’t want to punish the mullahs while the filthy Jews are sitting on nuclear weapons and he knows if Kerry is elected the only threat to Iran is Israel which Kerry is prepared to sell out for a chance to spoon with Chirac.
A few notes regarding surveillance and intelligence in this case:
– Satellites are VERY expensive and complicated, and require an extensive infrastructure to operate. They are therefore a fairly scarce and precious asset.
– The laws of physical optics are immutable–if you want a high-resolution image of something (and it’s difficult to make any assessment of activity at a military facility unless you have high-resolution coverage), you must be reasonably close. Geostationary imaging satellites would be completely useless for intelligence collection.
– The laws of orbital mechanics (which Hollywood can ignore with impunity in movies like Enemy of the State and Patriot Games) are similarly rigid. Any satellite operating at an altitude anywhere near that required by the laws of optics (see above) will have minutes, vice hours or days, of high-resolution imaging access to a given location at a given time.
– Al QaQaa was one of roughly 500 facilities associated with Iraq’s special weapons (WMD, missiles, high-explosives, etc.) programs, and was rated as a “medium” priority because there were a large number of sites associated with deadlier capabilities.
Also, here are a few military realities that pertain…
Even if there really are 380 tons of this stuff “missing”, it amounts to about seven hundredths of one percent of the 600,000 tons of explosives estimated to be in Iraq at the time of the invasion (over a third of which has been destroyed by Coalition forces).
– This stuff is not the most conducive to use in Improvized Explosive Devices (IEDs). Especially when there are hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of artillery shells and grenades of various types which are better suited and readily available–either due to (extensive) pre-war dispersal of such supplies by the Husayn government or by entering one of the several thousand ammunition storage locations.
– Husayn didn’t just wake up one morning in early March and decide maybe he ought to start thinking about what he’d do if Bush (who, remember, had recently eliminated the Taliban government of Afghanistan for refusing to turn over Bin Laden) actually decided to use the 100,000+ troops he had in Kuwait. He gave medals to a couple of Russian generals (retired, I believe) for their assistance to the Baathist state. One of those generals was ostensibly an expert in “guerrilla warfare”. You don’t suppose maybe he might actually have included forming guerrila-style units and training some of their members in IED construction, do you? And maybe he might have considered the possibility these guys might have the capability to build more than one bomb each, and thus might need a “stash” of explosives?
Amateurs talk tactics…professionals talk logistics!